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Abstract
Populist parties and actors now govern various countries around the world. Often elected by the
public in times of economic crises and over the perceived failure of the elites, the question stands
as to how populist governments actually perform once elected. Using the pandemic shock in the
form of the COVID-19 crises, our paper answers the question of how populist governments handle
the pandemic. We answer this question by introducing a theoretical framework according to
which (1) populist governments enact less far-reaching policy measures to counter the pandemic,
(2) lower the effort of citizens to counter the pandemic, and are ultimately (3) hit worse by the
pandemic. We test the propositions in a sample of 42 countries with weekly data from 2020.
Employing econometric models, we find empirical support for our propositions and ultimately
conclude that excess mortality exceeds the excess mortality of conventional countries by 10
percentage points (i.e., 100%). Our findings have important implications for the assessment of
populist government performance in general as well as counter-pandemic measures in particular
by providing evidence that opportunistic and inadequate policy responses as well as spreading
misinformation and downplaying the pandemic are strongly related to increases in COVID-19
mortality.
Keywords: Populism, COVID-19, Pandemic, Government Policy, Public Health
JEL Classification Codes: I18 (Government Policy, Public Health); C72 (Noncooperative
Games); H11 (Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government); H12 (Crisis Management)
1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic poses an unprecedented challenge for many governments around the
world. We focus on this challenge and the government responses to it by addressing the question:
How are populist governments handling the pandemic?
Specifically, how does the response of populist governments differ from non-populist governments
and are populist governments less successful in containing the pandemic?
In answering these questions, we add to the growing political economy literature on the
effect of different government types on pandemic responses. While an increasing number of
publications are concerned with the comparison between democratic and autocratic regimes
(e.g. Alon, Farrell, and Li, 2020; Cepaluni, Dorsch, and Branyiczki, 2020; Stasavage, 2020),
contributions addressing the effect of populist governments are still scarce. The few existing
studies either focus on single cases (e.g. Smith, 2020), lack a rigorous theoretical basis for
empirical analyses (e.g. McKee et al., 2020; Williams, Kestenbaum, and Meier, 2020), or only
address policies implemented at the onset without addressing their effectiveness (e.g. Kavakli,
2020).
We make two contributions. First, we develop a comprehensive formal model, directly
linking populism to specific types of pandemic responses. We model populist governance with a
pandemic shock. Second, we empirically analyse the propositions of our model in a sample of 42
developed and developing economies with novel data on government response from the Oxford
COVID-19 Response Tracker (Hale, Angrist, et al., 2021), citizen behavior from Google COVID-19
Mobility Reports, and the country-specific severity (excess mortality) of the pandemic.
Our formal model proposes two distinct but interconnected mechanisms on why the
pandemic response and severity systematically differs between populist and non-populist gov-
ernments. First, populists present themselves by definition as the embodiment of the will of
‘the people’ (see Urbinati, 2019). Consequently, the policies enacted by populist governments
tend to be ‘quick-fixes’, characterized by simple solutions for the short term (Dornbusch and Ed-
wards, 2007). Populist governments are thus less likely to implement far-reaching and targeted
measures to contain the spread of the virus. Second, populist governments tend to advocate
anti-scientific attitudes, which are rooted in an ‘anti-elite’ populist discourse (Mietzner, 2020).
Citizens subject to these anti-scientific views are less likely to take the virus seriously and comply
with public health recommendations (Gollwitzer et al., 2020).
Our theoretical model shows how a country becomes populist. Then, it goes on to
analyse the strategic behavior between the state and citizens in the context of a pandemic, fully
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incorporating the interdependence of public and private behavior actions in the context. For
example, lockdowns only work if the citizenry also engages in social distancing. Populist states
response to a pandemic may be more muted and delayed, in which case citizens also exercise
less caution. From this theoretical framework we derive the following three propositions: First,
populist government’s policy response is lower than that of conventional governments. Second,
the public effort to contain the pandemic is higher in non-populist led countries as these citizens
are not subject to regular anti-scientific messages from the government. The government’s policy
response and the citizen’s effort jointly determine the severity of the pandemic’s course. Thus,
our third proposition is that the pandemic likely runs a much more severe course in populist
governed countries.
We test these propositions using a sample of 42 developed and developing countries of
which 13 are populist governed. We analyze systematic differences in policy responses as well
as citizen behavior, and link these differences to a higher excess mortality in populist governed
countries, as theorized. Following our theory, we differentiate between two types of response
variables: Pandemic response (i.e. government policies, citizen behavior) and excess mortality.
This allows us to gain new insights into how governments responses and public efforts differ
across populist and conventional-led countries and how this difference amplifies the severity
of the pandemic. We find that populist governments are indeed less invested in implementing
targeted policy responses to reduce the spread of the pandemic. As theorized, citizen mobility
is also higher in populist-led countries. Taken together, we find that excess mortality is about
10 percentage points higher in populist than conventional countries and with that, the level of
excess mortality in populist countries is about double the level of excess mortality in non-populist
countries.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 outlines the relevant literature on the pandemic
performance of countries as well as on populist governance and political institutions more
generally. The theoretical foundation of our argument is presented in section 3. In section 4 we
introduce the data used to empirically test the propositions derived from the theory and provide
first descriptive insights. Section 5 presents the estimation models, results and robustness checks.
2 Literature Review
Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, a growing amount of literature has addressed the
question of how different regime types perform in countering the spread of the virus. While
it is widely believed that democracy is positively correlated with public health (Besley and
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Kudamatsu, 2006; Hall and Jones, 2007; Justesen, 2012; Patterson and Veenstra, 2016; Wigley
and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2017), implementing policy measures to counter a rapidly spreading and
unknown virus is different from gradually building an infrastructure that prevents certain health
conditions. Against this back drop and motivated by the success of the Chinese Government in
countering the pandemic the question has been raised whether autocratic countries like China
perform better in countering the COVID-19 pandemic.
Concerned with the onset of the pandemic, several contributions shows that democratic
countries have been hit especially hard by the pandemic, leading some to suggest that autocratic
regimes are somewhat more capable of quick responses to clear and present dangers (Alon,
Farrell, and Li, 2020; Cepaluni, Dorsch, and Branyiczki, 2020; Stasavage, 2020). Nonetheless,
additional studies have shown that although democracies have been hit more severely by the
pandemic in terms of infection rates, deaths rates are significantly lower in democratic countries
(Karabulut et al., 2021). This can be explained by the fact that democratic governments although
reluctant to close schools or radically limit freedom of movement and assembly (Cheibub, Hong,
and Przeworski, 2020; Sebhatu et al., 2020) are more able to deal with shocks to public health
as the health care systems are stronger. Further, the lag in response time is - if anything - largely
constrained to the very onset of the pandemic (Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi, 2020).
Concerned with the pandemic response and performance of countries, Bosancianu et al.
(2020) show that (1) state capacity, (2) political institutions, (3) political priorities, and (4)
social structures are the four central features that capture the pandemic performance of countries
and governments better than a simple division between autocracy and democracy. While many
contributions have weighed in on the discussion of autocratic versus democratic pandemic
response contributions concerned with populist governments and their pandemic response have
been rather scarce (see for some notable exceptions see e.g., Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi, 2020;
Gollwitzer et al., 2020; McKee et al., 2020; Mietzner, 2020; Smith, 2020; Williams, Kestenbaum,
and Meier, 2020; Wondreys and Mudde, 2020). The necessity of analyzing the performance
of populist governments is however of key importance as the outlined features that determine
pandemic performance are closely related to populism.
Previous research has shown that populist governments contribute to a reduction of state
capacity and democratic accountability (Cachanosky and Padilla, 2019; Rode and Revuelta,
2015). Strongly related to this is institutional decay under populist rule, which weakens the
political institutions and coincides with a decline in economic performance that further limits
state capacity (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2020). Contributions have further shown that
a special component of institutional decay under populist rule is limiting media freedom and
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independent journalism (Kenny, 2020). Media and press freedom again has been shown to
be strongly correlated with public health as people can receive independent information about
health and how to protect them against diseases (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2017).
Apart from state capacity and political institutions, several contributions have shown how
political priorities shift under populist rule. This shift is inevitably linked to the populist rhetoric
according to which the populist is the embodiment of the will of ’the common people’ who
enforces this will against ’the corrupt elite’ (Mudde, 2004; Urbinati, 2019). In their seminal
contribution on the economics of populism, Dornbusch and Edwards (2007) have shown that
populist governments are mainly interested in short-term solutions and ‘quick fixes’ that provide
’the people’ with what they want and not what is economically reasonable or sustainable. These
unsustainable policies are a major contributing factor to the often observed economic decline
under populist rule (Dovis, Golosov, and Shourideh, 2016). Analyzing the pandemic response
of populist governments, the few existing studies have shown that the observed ill-economic
performance of populist governments can also be transferred to the pandemic response in that
most populist governments downplayed the severity of the virus, suggested unfounded quick
and short term fixes, and strongly avoided regulations like wearing masks or limiting private
interaction (McKee et al., 2020; Smith, 2020).
While the enactment of unsound policies mostly relates to ’the people’ component of
the populist rhetoric, as the policies are aimed at providing what is popular with ’the people’
and not what is reasonable, the ’anti-elite’ components is often present in the rejection of
scientific evidence with populist governments regularly attacking scientific evidence, especially if
it contradicts their reasoning (Mietzner, 2020). Several contributions have shown that populists
in government and opposition have frequently and systematically taken anti-scientific positions
over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic (McKee et al., 2020; Williams, Kestenbaum, and
Meier, 2020; Wondreys and Mudde, 2020). Naturally, if the public perceives scientific evidence
as untrustworthy and the risk of the virus as marginal, compliance with health recommendations
is expected to be low. Concerned with the effect of this non-compliance with health regulations,
Gollwitzer et al. (2020) show that physical distancing is higher in counties with high vote
shares for the Democratic Party and low consumption of conservative media, while conservative
counties show higher mobility that lead to higher infection rates and COVID-19 fatalities.
An additional component that is strongly related to government performance and the
populist rhetoric is the social structure of a country, especially in terms of polarization as well as
income and health inequality. As previous contributions have shown that inequality is strongly
correlated with health and comorbidities in general (Durevall and Lindskog, 2012; Leigh, Jencks,
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and Smeeding, 2009; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006), it is no surprise that inequality is also related
to higher COVID-19 fatality rates (Abedi et al., 2020; Bambra et al., 2020; Patel et al., 2020).
Concerning inequality, research has shown that populists - although often claiming to target
the reduction of inequality - hardly reduce inequality and more than often worsen inequality
(Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2020; Pierson, 2017). In a similar manner, populism thrives in
times of polarization and increases polarization through the divisive populist rhetoric (De la Torre
and Ortiz Lemos, 2016; Silva, 2018). Societal division is again related to poor performance in
health crises due to scapegoating attempts and unwillingness to work together in countering
health risks (Lieberman, 2009).
The literature review shows that many features associated with populist governments
are frequently associated with low public health infrastructure and reduced performance in
countering public health crises, suggesting that populist governments might systematically
mishandle the COVID-19 pandemic. While this suggestion is evident based on the literature
review, contributions addressing the effect of populist governments are still scarce. The few
existing studies either focus on single cases (Smith, 2020), lack a rigorous theoretical basis for
empirical analyses (McKee et al., 2020; Williams, Kestenbaum, and Meier, 2020) or only address
policies implemented at the onset without addressing their effectiveness (Kavakli, 2020). Thus,
we extend the previous literature by (1) developing a comprehensive formal model that directly
links populism to specific types of pandemic responses and (2) testing the propositions of our
model in a global sample of 42 countries on a weekly basis for the year 2020.
3 Theory
We proceed by developing a model of populism. Our model features the demand and supply
of populist politics and thereby allows us to identify equilibria conditions. This first part of
the model maps the political environment shaping populist and conventional countries. It
explains and highlights long-term developments. After laying out the conditions for populism,
we introduce a shock (the COVID-19 pandemic). We then study how the public and politicians in
a given setting react to such a shock during the first year. The first part of the model determines
the political environment (populist or conventional). We presume this state remains in the
second part of the model. In other words, no political changes occur in the second state of the
model. We thus examine the short-term, in our case the first year of the pandemic. We then
analyze how the shock affects equilibria in populist and non-populist political systems. The role
played by the public and the politicians are highlighted in our model. Both actors play key roles
in how societies respond to the pandemic and thus, jointly, determine the probability of a more
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or less severe course of the pandemic. We derive a set of propositions from our model, which are
empirically tested in section 4 and 5.
3.1 The Demand and Supply for Populism
The Demand Side
Society has a total population, N, which can be decomposed into two groups A and B, with
individual from group A, who may support a populist politician. This group derives utility from
group identity and the provision of group specific public goods.1 B, represents the globalist
or cosmopolitan segment deriving their identity from a cosmopolitan perspective. Society is
unequal so that the median income (YM) is lesser than the mean income, YN .2 The distribution
of the two groups is given by nature, but can be influenced by circumstances, demographic
changes and so on; at any given moment we postulate that ρ is the population weight of A
type individuals, and 1 - ρ represents the proportion of B type persons. Individuals also derive
utility from their identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), self-image (Boulding, 1956), and actions
related to their identity.
Any individual citizen faces two possible states of the world, which he can only influence
via voting and political supportive behavior. In one, offered by politician A, appealing to group A,
the voter potentially sacrifices his individual economic interests so as to promote group identity
related action, which could include the provision of the group specific public goods (θA). A
populist politician or political faction then enables the emergence of this state of the world
via a vector of policies, and presumably further enriches the already rich, but permits some
nationalistic identity policies and gestures, such as restrictions on immigration, Brexit and the
proscription of Muslims in India. In that event, identity trumps economic interests. In another
state, B, enlightened self-interest or homo economicus prevails. In this state, the economic
interests of the majority or median voter (Downs et al., 1957), as traditionally understood in
political economy, are realised along with the universal provision of public goods. Public goods
include education and health expenditure, club goods encompass nationalistic policies. The
former should assist in mitigating the effects of the pandemic on excess mortality, as well as its
economic impact on unemployment.
We may, therefore, characterise the expected utility of a representative median individual
(i), who may belong to either of the two groups, as:
1We consider both left-wing and right-wing populist groups. Identity, which is featured in our model, serves to
distinguish populists from ‘globalists’ or elites with all forms of populism arguably being nationalist in one way or the
other (Taguieff, 1995)
2This does not mean that income is distributed evenly across individuals.
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Ui = ρ[YM ; θA; I] + (1− ρ)[YN ; θN ]; θN > θA (1)
In state A, which is the preferred outcome of the median voter with probability ρ, individual
incomes are related to societal median income (YM), which is less than mean income (YN).
The second term, θA is a group specific vector of public goods, which is rather like a club good,
defined by Cornes and Sandler, 1996 in that is non-rivalled but excludable in nature. This
includes a variety of nationalistic, anti-immigrant, anti-minority policies, but less public health
and education expenditure than in alternative states. The final term, I, refers to a vector of
identity based actions, discussed in Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, as well as Murshed, 2011. In the
context of the pandemic this can include denying its existence, attending right wing protests,
eschewing face masks and so on. For members of the more liberal group, their utility typically
will be in terms of individual income corresponding more to societal mean income (YN ), implying
greater redistribution, a public good that is available to the entire population (θN), as well as
liberal behavior. The second term on the right-hand side of (1) is indicative of B group utilities,
and 1 - ρ is the probability of the median voter falling into that group. The universal provision of
public goods would leave society better prepared for any health emergency, such as a pandemic.
To incorporate elements of the psychology of choice, we apply aspects of prospect theory to
the expected utility framework above, following Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman
and Tversky (1979). Individuals assign decision weights to each prospect in their universe
of choices. The decision weight depends, not just on its likelihood or probability but also its
desirability in the decision maker’s mind. A more worthy prospect is assigned a greater decision
weight. Hence, mental framing is crucial to this process. A voter may be more pre-disposed
to supporting populism because of their identity, age, life experiences and so on. A relatively
deprived voter who is precariously employed in the context of dwindling social protection may
have a greater preference for the populist/nationalist outcome. This choice will, however, also
be based on messages sent out by rival politicians
Ui = wA(ρ(a))[YM ; θA; I] + wB((1− ρ)(b))[YN ; θN ]− φS(a)− (1− φ)S(b) (2)
In (2) above the decision weights are denoted by w which reflects pre-disposition (wA for
populism), but the probability of support for populism also depends on the message (a) sent
out by populist politicians. Similarly, the non-populist prospect depends both on predisposition
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(wB) its probability and messaging, b, from more conventional politicians.3 Thus, we have made
support for populism or liberalism a function both of pre-disposition4 and electoral messaging.
S represents the cost of processing messages, a and b, from the populist and conventional
politicians respectively, equivalent to a signal extraction problem, involving discernment costs.
The parameter φ reflects this cost of processing political messages from different politicians, and
the relative size of this parameter varies across the two groups or individual type; in general
0 < φ < 1.
Equilibrium individual choices involve maximizing equation (2) with respect to a and b,
and arranging them in terms of marginal benefit equal to marginal cost for a representative
individual yields:
wAρa[YM ; θA; I] = φSa
and wB(1− ρ)b[YN ; θN ] = (1− φ)Sb. (3)
In (3) the marginal ‘benefit’ of the signal is on the right hand side, with the marginal cost on
the left hand side. The benefit depends both on pre-disposition (wA or wB) and message (a, b).
In other words, type A individuals are pre-disposed to supporting populism because of their
identity, age, life experiences and so on. Also a powerful populist message, when constructed in
simple terms, unlike a more complex expert opinion, can spread like a virus, irrespective of its
veracity. The right-hand sides of (3) indicate the cost of processing populist and non-populist
messages. If the cost of processing the populist message (a) is low, then φ→ 0, as is the case for
the type A individuals, who are likely to support the populist. For them, the cost of processing
the (more sophisticated) message, b is high. Exactly, the converse line of reasoning holds for
the type B (liberal) individual for whom φ→ 1 and the marginal benefit of the liberal political
campaign message [(1− ρ)]b is high, as is the decision weight for this outcome (wB).
Supply of Populism
Populist policies cannot materialise without their being offered, or supplied, by politicians. The
next step, therefore, is to describe political competition. Let us characterise this as the rivalry
between a politician or party drawn from group A and one from group B. The former, who is
the populist, utilises a populist message (a), and the latter a conventional message (b). Although
3We distinguish between a populist message a and a non-populist message b. Conventional (mainstream)
politicians, although not averse to soundbites and catchphrases, tend to project more measured arguments, which for
many members of the public feel like tedious expert arguments. In contrast, populists tend to broadcast unscientific,
simple solutions to complex problems.
4The pre-disposition argument is related to the cultural explanation for the support for populism outlined in Norris
and Inglehart (2019).
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both politicians want to enrich themselves personally, the politician from group B, proposes more
inclusive policies; whereas the politician from the populist group emphasises identity, and the
fact that the group’s interests will go further, even though it will immiserize the poor even more.
The populist and non-populist messages themselves are not detailed policy pronouncements but
are composed of metaphors that encourage certain types of voting behavior. We turn now to the
objective functions (V ) of the two politicians:
V A = ρ(a)WAA + (1− ρ)(b)WAB −A(a) (4)
with WAA = Y
A
G − θA +M ; WAB = Y A, and
V B = ρ(a)WBA + (1− ρ)(b)WBB −B(b) (5)
with WBB = [Y
B
G − θN +N ]; WBA = Y B.
Here the probability of the identity based outcome (ρ) promoted by politician, A, is enhanced
through populist message (a), and the probability 1 – ρ of the alternative is increased via
conventional messages (b). The cost functions associated with these messages are given by A
and B in equations 4 and 5 respectively. The W parameter indicates pay-offs to the politician
from the A and B groups (denoted by a superscript); the subscripts indicate who is in power, for
example WAB indicates the pay-off to A when B is in power, W
A
A when he is in power, and so on.
Pay-offs in power are greater than when out of power. When in power there is a political rent
from government (YG) less the cost of supplying the public good (θ) plus an additional vector of
other policy goals, M for the populist and N for the liberal politician. When out of power, the
politicians receive a smaller political rent (Y ).
The politicians of the A and B group, respectively maximize their value functions with
respect to the strategic variables, a and e in equations (4) and (5) respectively leading to the
equating of marginal benefits and costs:
ρWAA = Aa and (6)
(1− ρ)bWBB = Bb (7)
Equations 6 and 7 determine the optimal amounts of messages sent out by the rival politicians.
The equilibrium outcome in favor of, or against, populist politics, favored by group A, and the
corresponding politician who is a supplier of that vector of policies, depends upon the demand
for populism in favor of identity based outcomes (I) being a majority. Whether it is a majority
is influenced by the supply of messages (a) from the populist politician based on 6 above, and
how it influences voter behavior in equation 3. If the median voter is pre-disposed towards
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populism, they find the marginal benefit of the populist electoral message powerful, and has a
corresponding low marginal cost of processing the message relative to the rival liberal message,
a populist electoral victory will prevail in the equilibrium. Note, that the income of the median
voter is lower in the populist outcome, as is the provision of public goods.
3.2 Public-Private Interaction in the Context of a Pandemic
Once the pandemic strikes, it is worthwhile looking at a stylised model of mainly non-cooperative
behavior between the government (G) and the citizenry (P ). We postulate two states of nature:
one (L) with fewer infections (with an infection rate, r < 1) and low mortality, and the other
state (H) is associated with greater mortality and higher infections, r > 1. Their probabilities
are defined as π and 1 - π, respectively. This probability π(g, e) is affected by an action (g) by the
government and effort (e) on the part of the public. Examples of the former include the speed
with which lockdowns are imposed, the rigor of the lockdown, test-tracing regimes; instances
of the latter include social distancing behavior and the wearing of face masks. Even the more
cynical and plutocratic (sometimes populist) governments are compelled in to action by health
capacity constraints. Actions and efforts are the ‘strategic’ or behavioral variables employed by
the government and private citizenry during the pandemic. We postulate that the probability of
the less virulent version of the pandemic (L), π increases with the input of action and effort by
both government and private citizens, hence there is an inter-dependence between actions and
efforts in lowering the impact of the pandemic.
The government’s expected utility (UG) may be denoted as:




G ) + (1− π(g, e))UHG (Y HG )− C(g) (8)
where Y LG and Y
H
G denote ‘pay-offs’ in the low and high state of the pandemic. The pay-offs are
greater in the low-state of the pandemic, both for the governments and the public.
(Y LN − rL) > (Y HN − rH)
C is the cost function of undertaking the action, g, which diminishes the chances of a more
virulent pandemic, but these actions entail a cost, for example in terms of both expenditures, as
well as foregone revenue and rents. Also, πg > 0, but πgg < 0;5 there are diminishing returns to





actions in terms of lowering the chances of a virulent pandemic. Both Cg > 0 and Cgg > 0, costs
of actions to mitigate the pandemic rise monotonically.





P ) + (1− π(g, e))UHP (Y HP )− E(e) (9)
with (Y LM −DL) > (Y HM −DH).
Where, D is the disutility from the risk of infection, the representative private agent
receives median income (YM ), which is lower when the pandemic is more severe due to reduced
employment opportunities, E is the cost of effort, e, which increases the probability of a less
severe pandemic, π. Also, πe > 0, but πee < 0, Ee > 0, and Eee > 0. Pay-offs include not just a
pecuniary component, but also a measure of the psychic costs of bereavement, as well as the
disutility of confinement during lockdowns which lower the severity of the pandemic.
Both the government and private individuals maximise the benefit of their action and
efforts to lower the severity of the pandemic bearing in mind the cost of actions and efforts. They















P )− UHP (Y HP )] = Ee. (11)
In order to characterize strategic behavior we can derive (linear) reaction functions for
both sides, obtained by totally differentiating Equations 10 and 11 with respect to g and e. For
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Figure 1: Government response and citizen
effort are strategic complements
Figure 2: Government response and citizen
effort are strategic substitutes
Note, that πgg[UHG (Y
H
G )−ULG(Y LG )] > 0 and πee[UHP (Y HP )−ULP (Y LP )] > 0 since πgg < 0 and
πee < 0 and the utility in the less severe state (L) is higher than in the highly severe state (H)
(thus, the expressions in square brackets are negative). Second derivatives of cost functions are
positive.
It follows, that the reaction functions are positively sloped if πge > 0, implying that the
two strategies are complements (figure 1). Thus if the government increases its actions, the
public respond in the same direction. We, however, also allow for the possibility that πge < 0,
the choice variables are strategic substitutes, and the reaction functions could therefore slope
downwards (figure 2). This is when either sides attempts to free ride on the other.
When strategies or actions and efforts to reduce pandemic severity for the government
and private citizens are complements (figure 1), a spike in the infection rate r from 8 will shift
the government reaction function outwards along the public’s reaction function with a new
equilibrium at point K indicating more strategic actions and efforts by both government and
public. In the case of populist led governments with greater lockdown aversion, this response may,
however, be delayed and the magnitude of the shift could be smaller if the actions undertaken
by the state are less rigorous, implying that the new point K, is somewhere to the left and below
the point indicated in figure 1, with less preventive behavior on the part of both government and
individuals.
In figure 2, where pandemic effect influencing actions and efforts by the government and
public respectively are substitutes we illustrate a case where the government’s pay-off from
pandemic prevention diminishes, say due its plutocratic nature and aversion to lockdowns; its
reaction function moves down along the public reaction function with a new equilibrium at K,
where the public has so greatly attenuated its prudential efforts that the state, even a populist run
government with a strong lockdown aversion, is compelled to respond by increasing its actions
in the face of such irresponsible private behavior, and an unacceptable high rate of infection,
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as well as mortality, relative to prevailing medical capacity. This may help explain the late, but
more prolonged, lockdowns, such as in the UK.
While figure 2 is theoretically possible, our empirical analysis below in section 5 provides
general empirical support for the relationship portrayed in figure 1. That is to say, we find more
compelling evidence for a complementary relationship between the government’s policy and the
citizens’ behavior.
3.3 Propositions derived from the theoretical Model
In summary, our theoretical model illustrates how choices on the government (g) and public side
(e) determine the probability of a more (1− π) or less severe (π) course of the pandemic.
There is a dynamic between the public and the politicians which we model as the supply
and demand of populism. In the first part of the model, supply and demand conditions determine
whether a country is led by a populist or conventional party. This part of the model frames the
different political contexts, distinguishing populist and conventional countries. In the populist
setting, the citizenry is constantly exposed to populist messaging (a), in turn creating a less
scientific/fact-based environment. In sections 4 and 5, we code countries as being populist or
not.
Building on this first part of the model, we introduce a pandemic shock. The two types of
politicians (populist and conventional) produce two types of policy responses. The public, in
turn, behave differently in the two policy environments. From this part of the model, we derive
the following propositions:
1. Populist governments are less invested in far-reaching policy responses to contain a pan-
demic shock.
2. In a populist political environment, citizens are less likely to exert high effort to limit the
spread of the disease.
3. Severity of pandemic is jointly determined by citizen effort and government policy response.
4 Data
The propositions of our formal model are analyzed in a sample of 42 developed and developing
countries of which 11 are governed by populist countries. The main variables of interest to our
analysis are excess mortality, government policy response, and citizen mobility. The following
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sections provide an overview of the data and operationalisation and give first descriptive insights
on variable specific differences between populist and non-populist governments.
4.1 Sample
Our aim is to include major advanced and emerging economies worldwide in the dataset. We
start by including all current OECD members. To include major emerging economies and
broaden the geographic coverage, we also included the BRICS countries in our sample. While
including more smaller emerging economies might lead to additional insights, the sample is
restricted due to data limitations especially regarding excess mortality. In total our sample covers
42 countries.6 The time frame of our analysis is limited to 2020 and for some variables and
countries the coverage is truncated at the beginning and the end of 2020. Our unit of analysis
are country-week observations.
4.2 Populist governments
In order to code the populist governments in our sample, we follow Mudde (2004, p. 543) and
define populism as a thin ideology that considers society to be “separated into two homogeneous
and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”. Based on this
definition we followed other contributions and used a literature based approach to code the
governments in our sample (Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch, 2020). In doing so, we identified
the parties and politicians from our sample countries that are classified as being populist in the
literature. As a baseline source, we relied on the PopuList project by Rooduijn et al. (2019) to
code populist parties governing parties in our sample.
For the countries not included in the PopuList and countries with presidential systems, we
used additional sources stated in the appendix. We code a government as populist if two criteria
are met. First, the literature identifying a party or leader as populist has to share our definition
of populism. Second, a government is coded as populist if either the countries leader is classified
as populist (e.g. Donald Trump in the USA) or if the party of a countries leader is classified as
populist (e.g. the PiS party in Poland).
Using this approach, we identify 11 populist governed countries in our sample. These are:
Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Israel, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia (since 03/20/2020),
6Sample countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia,






Figure 3: Populist and non-populist governed countries in the sample
Turkey, the UK and the USA. In all but one case, the populist governments have been in power
since the beginning of the year. Table A1 lists all the leaders in our sample, the party they belong
to, their time in office in 2020, and the coding source if we coded them as populists. The global
sample countries subdivided into populist and non-populist governments is displayed in figure 3.
4.3 Excess mortality
We measure the severity of the pandemic by using the country specific excess mortality (ExMort).
Checchi and Roberts, 2005, define excess mortality as the number of fatalities that occur addition-
ally to the deaths that would have been expected under normal conditions, or, as the WHO puts it,
”Mortality above what would be expected based on the non-crisis mortality rate in the population
of interest. Excess mortality is thus mortality that is attributable to the crisis conditions. It can
be expressed as a rate (the difference between observed and non-crisis mortality rates), or as a
total number of excess deaths.”7 Using excess mortality has been proven to be an adequate and
less biased measure of pandemic severity (Rivera, Rosenbaum, and Quispe, 2020). Based on the





where the excess mortality (ExMort) is the percentage point deviation of the total deaths
recorded in a given week (TotalDeaths) from the expected deaths (ExpectedDeaths). The
expected deaths are calculated by using the average deaths of the last (available) five years.
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Figure 4: Average excess mortality during 2020 with fitted values
Notes: The figure shows the excess mortality in our sample (light blue circles) as well as
the quadratic fitted response aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist governed
countries (grey) with 95% confidence intervals. The excess mortality is the percentage
divergence from the expected deaths of the given period. The data comes from the sources
indicated in table A2.
We draw the total and expected deaths for the weeks of 2020 from various sources listed
in table A2. The table also indicates the coverage and periodicity. For 40 our 42 sample countries
we retrieved mortality data. The countries missing are India and China. In the remaining
countries the data is available on a weekly basis except for Russia and Japan. In these two cases
we calculated the weekly average from the monthly data. For Turkey the data only covers the
weekly mortality in Istanbul as no data is available for the rest of the country.
The values of the excess mortality variable in the sample range from -40 to 156.3 with
an average excess mortality of 10.49 and a standard deviation of 20.78. In the sub-sample of
non-populist governed countries the average excess mortality for 2020 is 8.29. Moving from
non-populist to populist governed countries this number more than doubles to 17.14. This
difference in means is also statistically significant when employing a two-sample T-test. To
analyze the scores across time, figure 4 plots the excess mortality for the weeks of 2020.
The figure plots the individual excess mortality (light blue circles) as well as the quadratic
fitted mobility aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist governed (grey) countries.
Around the fitted lines a 95% confidence interval is plotted. The figure shows that the average
excess mortality in populist governed countries is systematically higher than in the non-populist
governed countries. The mortality difference is not statistically significantly before week 15 of
2020. However, after week 15 the excess mortality increases in populist governed countries





















0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Week in 2020
Individual observations
Fitted values for all non-populist governments (with 95% CI)
Fitted values for all populist governments (with 95% CI)
Figure 5: Average policy response with fitted values
Notes: The figure shows the average policy response of governments (“Containment and
Health” variable from Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale, Angrist, et al.,
2021)) in our sample (light blue circles) as well as the quadratic fitted response aggregated
by populist (green) and non-populist governments (grey) with 95% confidence intervals.
4.4 Policy response
We measure the government policy response to the COVID pandemic with the data from the
Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale, Angrist, et al., 2021). The database
provides detailed information on (1) containment, (2) health and (3) economic policies with
20 specific sub-categories of policy responses. Further, the database also gives aggregated
indices of policy responses. Since we are interested in the specific government response to
contain the pandemic and protect the population, we employ the “containment and health index”
(ContainHealth), which gives an aggregated response value for the containment and health
policies. The index ranges from 0 (no measures taken) to 100 (all measures taken).
Figure 5 plots the individual scores (light blue circles) as well as the quadratic fitted
response aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist governments (grey). Around the
fitted lines a 95% confidence interval is plotted. Surprisingly, the figure shows that the average
policy response score of populist governments is slightly higher than the response of non-populist
governments even when controlling for the country specific number of COVID-19 cases. The
question is how this policy response difference can be explained as this would mean that the
countries with a stronger policy response also see higher excess mortality rates.
While the index from the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker provides an
extraordinary basis for the analysis of government responses, it is important to note that some
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Figure 6: Average policy response with fitted values
Notes: The figure shows the average policy response of governments (“Containment and
Health” variable from Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale, Angrist, et al.,
2021)) in our sample (light blue circles) as well as the quadratic fitted response aggregated
by populist (green) and non-populist governments (grey) with 95% confidence intervals.
The policy response is plotted against the positive test ration retrieved from the Our World
in Data database (Roser et al., 2020).
institutional power and are not aimed at countering the specific spread of the virus (Lührmann
and Rooney, 2020). This consideration is supported by figure 6, which plots the policy response
of populist and non-populist governments against the positive test ratio from the Our World in
Data database (Roser et al., 2020). The figure shows that the policy response of non-populist
governments is dependent on the positive test ratio, i.e. the spread of virus, while the policy
response of populist governments is indifferent to the spread of the virus and significantly lower
at high positive test ratios.
Based on this, we argue that using the policy response index without further adjustment
creates the risk of including policy responses not aimed at protecting the public against the
pandemic, but at consolidating government power. We account for this problem by including the
data from the V-Dem Pandemic Backsliding Project (Kolvani et al., 2020). From this we use the
index on the “Pandemic Violations of Democratic Standards” (PanDem), which gives the extent
to which the respective pandemic policy responses violate democratic standards for quarters of
2020. To create a weekly measure we matched the PanDem index with the last week of every
quarter and interpolated the values in-between. The index ranges from 0 (no violations) to 1
(maximum violations).
To combine the policy response and pandemic backsliding measure we normalized the
PanDem index to range from 0 to 100. We then subtracted this measure from the ContainHealth
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index.8 The resulting measure (RealContainHealth) gives us the real government response to
the pandemic that only includes the policies directed at protecting the public against the spread
of the virus.9
The values of the policy response variable in our sample across the entire period of analysis
range from 0 to 87.33 with an average policy response value of 42.74 and a standard deviation of
23.2. In the sub-sample of non-populist government the average policy response score is 44.61.
In the populist government, this average policy response score is with 37.14 about 7.5 points
lower. This difference in means is also statistically significant when employing a two-sample
T-test. To analyze the values of the government policy response in greater detail and across time,
figure 7 plots the policy response for all weeks of 2020.
The figure plots the individual scores (light blue circles) as well as the quadratic fitted
response aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist governments (grey). Around the fitted
lines a 95% confidence interval is plotted. The figure shows that the average policy response score
of populist governments is systematically lower than the response of non-populist governments.
While the response is similar in the beginning of 2020, the policy responses diverge after week
10, with non-populist governments implementing more policies aimed at pandemic containment
and protection of the population. This difference is statistically significant after week 10.
4.5 Citizen behavior
We measure the citizen behavior by utilizing the comprehensive data from the Google Mobility
Report.10 The report is broken down by location and shows how the number of visits to places
like grocery stores and parks has diverged from the baseline between from the February 7 to
December 31, 2020. The baseline is the median mobility value of the five weeks from January 3
to February 6, 2020. We combine the daily mobility data from the various sub-categories into
a one weekly citizen mobility average. This gives us the weekly citizen mobility in 2020 as a
percentage point divergence to the pre-pandemic period of 2020.
Figure 8 plots the individual observations (light blue circles) as well as the quadratic fitted
response aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist governments (grey). Around the fitted
lines a 95% confidence interval is plotted. The figure shows that the average mobility score
8Due to data limitations this adjustment can only be made after week 13 of 2020. Before that the unadjusted
policy response is used.
9To assure that our results are not driven by this approach, we run additional regressions over the course of the
robustness checks, where the policy response is not calculated relative to the pandemic backsliding, but relative to
the spread of the virus in the respective country.
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Figure 7: Average policy response with fitted values
Notes: The figure shows the average real policy response of governments in our sample
(light blue circles) as well as the quadratic fitted response aggregated by populist (green)
and non-populist governments (grey) with 95% confidence intervals. The real policy re-
sponse is calculated by subtracting the normalized Pandemic Backsliding index of the V-Dem
Pandemic Backsliding Project (Kolvani et al., 2020) from the Containment and Health index
of the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Hale, Angrist, et al., 2021).
hardly differs between populist and non-populist governed countries with the fitted mobility line
in non-populist governed countries being slightly higher between week 20 and 40.
However, the citizen mobility is contingent on the actual spread of the virus. This reasoning
is underscored by figure 9, which shows the citizen mobility in populist (green) and non-populist
(grey) governments and plots it against the positive test ratio. The figure shows that citizen
mobility has to be placed into context with the actual spread of the virus, as the figure very clearly
shows that citizen mobility is higher in populist governed countries at similar infection rates.
We account for the necessity to account for the infection rate by combining the mobility data
with data on positive test ration from the database of Johns Hopkins University’s Coronavirus
Resource Center.11 In doing so, we use the positive test ratio to control for underestimating the
virus spread by only using the relative or total number of infected persons without accounting
for the number of tests conducted. Based on this, the relative mobility (RelMobil) is calculated
by first normalizing the citizen mobility to range from 0 (total reduction in mobility) to (100
no reduction in mobility). Second, we multiplied this normalized variable with the positive test
ratio to generate relative mobility (RelMobil). The data is missing for China and Iceland.
The values of the public mobility variable in the sample range from 0 to 100 with an
average relative mobility score of 12.95 and a standard deviation of 15.66. In the sub-sample
of non-populist government the average relative mobility is 10.52. In comparison to this, the
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Figure 8: Average mobility during 2020 with fitted values
Notes: The figure shows the average citizen mobility in our sample (light blue circles)
as well as the quadratic fitted response aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist
governed countries (grey) with 95% confidence intervals. The mobility data comes from
the Google Mobility Report.
average mobility score in populist governed countries is almost twice as high with a score of 20.
This difference in means is also statistically significant when employing a two-sample T-test. To
again analyze the scores in detail and across time, figure 10 plots the mobility for the weeks of
2020.
The figure plots the individual scores (light blue circles) as well as the quadratic fitted
mobility aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist governments (grey). Around the fitted
lines a 95% confidence interval is plotted. The figure shows that the average mobility in populist
governed countries is systematically higher than the in the non-populist governed countries.
Similar to the policy response the citizen mobility is not significantly different between the
two groups in the beginning of 2020. However, while the difference drops further in the non-
populist governed countries over the course of 2020 the relative mobility increases in populist
governed countries over the course of 2020. This difference is statistically significant after week
15.
In sum, the descriptive evidence in this section supports our three central theoretical
considerations on differences between populist and non-populist governed countries. First,
populist governed countries have implemented less policies to contain the pandemic and protect
the population. Second, citizen mobility has been higher in populist governed countries in 2020
although we specifically account for the spread of the virus in the respective countries. Third,
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Figure 9: Average citizen mobility with fitted values
Notes: The figure shows the average citizen mobility in our sample (light blue circles)
as well as the quadratic fitted response aggregated by populist (green) and non-populist
governed countries (grey) with 95% confidence intervals. The mobility data comes from
the Google Mobility Report. The mobility is plotted against the positive test ration retrieved
from the Our World in Data database (Roser et al., 2020).
5 Estimation
Moving beyond the purely descriptive evidence we run several econometric models to assess
the correlation between populist governance and our three main variables of interest: Excess
mortality, policy response, and citizen mobility. Our main analysis consists of four regression
models. In the first three models we regress the three variables of interest on the populist
governance dummy variable with fixed effects. The response variables are respectively adjusted
for pandemic backsliding as well as the positive test ratio as described above. To analyze how
the policy response and citizen mobility are again correlated with excess mortality, the fourth
regression models uses unmodified policy response and citizen mobility with populist governance
interaction terms as explanatory variables. The following sections describe the main and control
variables used in the analysis and provide details on our estimation methods
5.1 Variables
The three main variables of the analysis are excess mortality, government policy response, and
citizen mobility. Based on the descriptive findings, the policy response is again corrected by
accounting for pandemic backsliding, and citizen mobility is expressed in relative terms to the
spread of the virus, i.e. positive test ratio. In terms of control variables, our empirical models
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Figure 10: Average mobility during 2020 with fitted values
Notes: The figure shows the average relative citizen mobility in our sample (light blue
circles) as well as the quadratic fitted response aggregated by populist (green) and non-
populist governed countries (grey) with 95% confidence intervals. The relative mobility is
calculated by multiplying average citizen mobility from the Google Mobility Report with the
positive test ration from the Coronavirus Resource Center of Johns Hopkins University.
control for any unobserved between country difference that might correlate with the dependent
as well as the independent variables in our analysis. Nevertheless, we drop the country fixed
effects in the robustness checks and include several control variables. The control variables can
be grouped in six categories.
The first set of control variables centers around a countries exposure to the pandemic. We
include a country’s KOF globalization index (Gygli et al., 2019) as well as the trade to GDP
ratio (Bank, 2021) to control for the correlation between globalization and the spread of the
virus (Farzanegan, Feizi, and Gholipour, 2021). Second, we control for a country’s capability in
countering the pandemic by including the V-Dem electoral democracy score (Coppedge, Gerring,
Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Alizada, et al., 2021)12 and the GDP per capita in constant US$
(Bank, 2021). Third, the health expenditure per capita in US$, physician density per 1,000
citizens, and nurses per 1,000 citizens are included to account for the control for the health
infrastructure (World Health Organization, 2018).
Fourth, we control for economic and health inequality by including the Middle 40% pre-tax
national income share (Alvaredo et al., 2018), the GINI index (Bank, 2021), and V-Dem health
inequality score (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Alizada, et al., 2021). Fifth and
last, we account for country specific vulnerability by including population density measured by
12The Electoral Democracy Index is part of the V-Dem Dataset v11 (Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell,
Alizada, et al., 2021; Pemstein et al., 2021). More information on the Index and all other V-Dem variables is provided
in Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, et al., 2021.
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the people per sq-km, population aged 65 and above, and the percentage of population with
completed secondary education (Bank, 2021), as well as the cardiovascular death rate, the
diabetes prevalence in population, and the percentage of male smokers in percent (Roser et al.,
2020) to control for comorbidities. For all the control variables we included the values of the last
available year before 2020. Due to this approach, all control variables are constant for individual
countries across the weeks of 2020.
5.2 Method
Since our main variables a normally distributed and we expect a more or less linear relationship
between the variables, we estimate the correlation between the variables by running OLS-
regression analyses. We account for the panel-like structure in our data by including week and
country fixed effects. As we assume our sample to be rather heterogeneous, we employ robust
standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity. Our baseline model is defined by:
Y ic,w = Populistc,w + βχ
j
w + λw + γc + ε, (15)
where Y is the respective response variable i in country c in week w that is regressed on the
populist dummy Populist in the same period of time. Additionally, with χ a vector of the
described control variables j in the given week w is included, as well as a term denoting week
(λ) fixed effects and country (γ) fixed effects if the control variables are not employed.
Additionally, we also run a combined model that includes the relative mobility and pan-
demic response variables as explanatory variables and solely regress the excess mortality on
these explanatory variables. The explanatory variables are lagged by four to eight weeks, as
previous research has shown that increased infections rates are correlated with increased deaths
rates with a lag of 20 to 63 days, i.e. four to eight weeks (Chrusciel and Szybka, 2021; Testa
et al., 2020). With this model we are able to assess how the variables that we assume to be
correlated with populist governance - policy response and citizen mobility - are again correlated
with excess mortality. The baseline model is defined by:
ExMortc,w = Responsec,w−i +Mobilityc,w−i + λw + γc + ε i = 4, ..., 8, (16)
where ExMort is the is the country c and week w specific excess mortality that is regressed on
an i weeks lagged policy Response and citizen Mobility variable. Again, week (λ) and country
(γ) fixed effects are included.
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5.3 Results
The results of the first regression analysis are displayed in table 1. In this analysis the corrected
policy response is regressed on the populist government dummy. The first model reports the
coefficient of the bivariate regression without any fixed effects or robust standard errors. The
negative coefficient indicates that the pandemic policy response score is lower in populist
governed countries. This negative correlation is also statistically significant. Using robust
standard errors in the second model does not change this result.
In the third model country fixed effects are included. Using country fixed effects changes
the coefficient substantially. This is not surprising as country specific factors greatly impact a
countries performance in the pandemic. Model 4 additionally also uses week fixed effects, which
lead to a reduction in the size of the coefficient. Again, this is no surprise as the pandemic
unfolds in waves and learning effects occur. To control for heteroscedasticity model 6 again
includes robust standard errors with no effect on the statistical significance of the results.
The last model controls for individual outliers by jackknifing the standard errors. Although
the standard errors slightly increase - speaking for the heterogeneous nature of the sample - the
coefficient remains statistically significant. Taken together, the first analysis concerned with the
government policy response supports our expectation that populist governments have employed
less policy measures to protect the population against the pandemic.
Table 1: Populist governments and policy response
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
populist -7.474*** -7.474*** -26.903*** -8.401*** -8.401*** -8.401***
(1.23) (1.21) (7.51) (2.88) (2.24) (2.31)
constant 44.612*** 44.612*** 49.097*** 9.499*** 9.499*** 9.499***
(0.62) (0.62) (3.69) (2.07) (2.37) (2.43)
Observations 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849 1,849
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.179 0.851 0.851 0.851
Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Jackknifed SE No No No No No Yes
(Robust) standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results of the second regression analysis are displayed in table 2. In this analysis the
relative citizen mobility is regressed on the populist government dummy. The different models
follow the same combination of fixed effects and corrected standard errors as the previous
regression analysis. In line with our expectation, the coefficient of the first model indicates as
positive correlation between populist governance and relative citizen mobility.
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Table 2: Populist governments and citizen mobility
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
populist 9.765*** 9.765*** 19.487*** 19.234*** 19.234*** 19.234***
(0.88) (1.19) (1.05) (2.25) (1.50) (1.54)
constant 10.294*** 10.294*** 0.663*** -8.427 -8.427 -8.427
(0.44) (0.34) (0.21) (5.46) (15.21) (20.21)
Observations 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527
R-squared 0.074 0.074 0.459 0.584 0.584 0.584
Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Jackknifed SE No No No No No Yes
(Robust) standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Similar to the previous analysis the size of the coefficient considerably changes when
including country fixed effects in the third model. Other than before the size of the coefficient is
however not reduced by including week fixed effects. This indicates that although the mobility
differs between countries it does not differ by time. As the mobility is already put in relative
terms this is only logical, since the main time-series variance stems from the different waves of
the pandemic that allow more or less movement. The statistical significance of the coefficient
is also no effect by using robust and jackknifed standard errors in the remaining models. The
results strongly support the second proposition of our model, according to which we expect
higher citizen mobility in populist governed countries.
The results of the third and last of the bivariate regression analysis are displayed in table
3. In this analysis the excess mortality is regressed on the populist government dummy. Again,
the same combination of fixed effects and robust standard errors is employed. The first model
reports a positive and statistically significant coefficient. From this follows that excess mortality
is positively correlated with populist governance. Similar to the previous findings, the size of the
coefficient considerably changes when including country fixed effects. Again indicating that the
correlation is considerably stronger in populist governed countries when controlling for other
between country differences. Model 4 again introduces week fixed effects, slightly reducing the
size of the coefficient. The last models with robust and jackknifed standard errors do not report
differences in terms of statistical significance. In conclusion, the last of the bivariate regression
analyses supports our expectations that excess mortality is higher in populist governed countries.
Moving beyond the bivariate regressions analyses, the fourth regression analysis regress
the excess mortality on the weekly lagged policy response and citizen mobility. The results of this
fourth regression analysis are displayed in table 4. The first model reports the coefficient for the
four weeks lag. The coefficient of the response variable is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that the policy response is negatively correlated with excess mortality. Hence, if the
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Table 3: Populist governments and excess mortality
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
populist 8.875*** 8.875*** 20.297*** 19.955*** 19.955*** 19.955***
(1.04) (1.23) (2.00) (3.22) (1.97) (2.02)
constant 8.260*** 8.260*** 0.242 -13.186*** -13.186*** -13.186***
(0.52) (0.47) (0.71) (3.53) (2.58) (2.64)
Observations 2,045 2,045 2,045 2,045 2,045 2,045
R-squared 0.034 0.034 0.134 0.394 0.394 0.394
Country Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Jackknifed SE No No No No No Yes
(Robust) standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
policy response is low, excess mortality is high. Contrary to this, the coefficient of the mobility
variable is positive and statistically significant. From this follows that high relative mobility is
correlated with high excess mortality. However, it is important to underscore that the relative
mobility also includes the positive test ratio, which naturally correlates with excess mortality.
Nonetheless, the correlation with the relative mobility is of importance as the relative mobility is
low even if positive test ratios are high as long as absolute mobility is low. The remaining models
use additional week lags with both variables lagged up to eight weeks. Although varying in size
the coefficients remain statistically significant across the models and do not change their signs.
Table 4: Excess mortality with relative mobility and policy response





















constant -11.507** -11.558** -12.551* -11.123 -8.580
(4.93) (5.82) (7.31) (9.82) (11.86)
Observations 1,130 1,102 1,073 1,044 1,015
R-squared 0.638 0.610 0.594 0.579 0.570
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 11: Marginal effects for mobility and response
In sum, these findings indicate that both relative mobility and the government policy
response are correlated with excess mortality as expected. With this finding the last link of our
theoretical model is supported empirically, in that we have found that populist governance is
positively correlated with excess mortality on the macro-level. The micro foundation of our
theorized mechanism has further found support in the negative correlation between populist
governance and policy response as well as the positive correlation between populist governance
and citizen mobility. Lastly, we were able to show that lower policy responses and increased
citizen mobility are again correlated with higher excess mortality, empirically supporting the
theorized causal relationship between populist governance and excess mortality.
In order to assess whether the found statistically significant correlations are also relevant
in substantial terms, we estimate the marginal effects. We calculate the marginal effects for the
policy response and relative citizen mobility between the 10th and 90th percentile based on
the model on which the variables are lagged by four weeks. The results are displayed in figure
11. The left figure again shows the negative correlation between government response and
predicted excess mortality. If the policy response increases by 45 points (2 standard deviations)
the predicted excess mortality decreases by about 10 percentage points (0.5 standard deviations).
In comparison, the right figure shows the positive correlation between citizen mobility and
excess mortality. The figure shows that an increase by 30 points (2 standard deviations) leads to
an increase in predicted excess mortality of about 15 percentage points (0.75 standard deviation).
From this follows that both variables are correlated with excess mortality in substantial terms.
At last, we also calculate the marginal effects of populist governance on excess mortality.
The employed model is a the simple bivariate regression displayed above (see table 3) with week
fixed effects and robust standard errors. The predicted marginal effects are displayed in figure
12. The figure shows that changing from non-populist to populist governments is associated with
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Figure 12: Marginal effects for populist governments
In conclusion, the empirical analysis provides statistically significant and substantially
relevant support for the theoretical propositions of our formal model. We could show that excess
mortality is systematically higher in populist governments when controlling for between country
variations with excess mortality on average being 10 percentage points higher ceteris paribus
in populist governed countries in comparison to non-populist governed countries. Further, we
were able to show that populist governments display lower policy response scores and higher
citizen mobility, which again is correlated with higher levels of excess mortality. Based on this,
we conclude that the analysis supports the mechanism that links populist governance to excess
mortality as well as the micro foundation of this relationship via policy responses and citizen
mobility.
5.4 Robustness checks
The robustness of our empirical results are assessed by running additional regression analysis that
utilize different operationalisations, control variables, and models. First, we re-ran the regression
analysis concerned with the policy response of populist governments with control variables and
without country fixed effects (table A3). The size and statistical significance of the coefficient
remains stable across the different model specifications. To control for the operationalisation
of the policy response variable, we calculate the corrected policy response not by subtracting
the pandemic backsliding score but by dividing the policy response by the positive test ratio.
This results in a measure that gives the adequacy of the policy response. Running the previous
regression analysis with this measure provides similar and robust results (table A4).
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Further, we also run regressions that include the control variables instead of the country
fixed effects for the relative citizen mobility and the excess mortality (table A5 and table A6)
Both regressions provide similar and robust results with exception to the last model concerned
with citizen mobility, in which the coefficient strongly increases, coming close to the coefficient
that is retrieved when using country fixed effects. This finding underscores that running country
fixed effects greatly controls for the between country variation. From this we conclude that our
models are not affected by our operationalization and the employment of country fixed effects.
At last, we also ran additional marginal effects models that use the four and eight weeks lag
model (figure 13 and figure 14). The results are quite similar with minor differences in the
strength of the predicted effect.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the question how the response to the COVID-19 pandemic differs between
populist and non-populist governments. Specifically, we study whether populist governments
are more or less likely to contain the pandemic. We develop a theoretical model of the supply
and demand of populism that explains under which conditions countries are led by populist vs.
non-populist parties. In the second part of our theoretical model we introduce a pandemic shock
and illustrate how government response and public effort affect the probability of the pandemic
running a (less) severe course. Based on this model we provided two mechanisms as to why
populist governments mishandle the pandemic.
First, populist governments are less likely to implement long-term and unpopular policies
but are rather prone towards short-termed quick fixes. Second, we reasoned that populist
governments influence the behavior of citizens not only through specific policies but also
through means of communication about the severity of the pandemic. We argued that populist
governments will advocate anti-scientific positions and downplay the severity of the pandemic.
Citizens exposed to this are less likely to take the virus seriously and comply with public health
regulations.
Based on our model, we formulated the propositions that (1) the policy response to counter
the pandemic is lower in populist governed countries, (2) the citizen effort is lower in populist
governed countries, and the two mechanisms together lead to the expectation that (3) populist
governed countries are more affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The propositions of our formal
model were tested with several empirical models in sample of 42 developed and developing
countries on a weekly basis between the first and last week of 2020 that included 13 populist
governed countries.
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First, we analyzed the correlation between populist governance and policy response and
found that - in line with our propositions - populist governments exhibited lower policy response
scores. The policy response scores in our analysis were corrected with the V-Dem pandemic
backsliding scores and for robustness checks also with the positive test ratio. Second, we found
a positive correlation between populist governance and citizen mobility indicating that citizen
mobility has been higher in populist governed countries. In our models, we used the relative
citizen mobility, which accounts for the respective spread of the virus with the positive test
ratio. Third, we analyzed the correlation between populist governance and excess mortality
with the result that excess mortality is higher in populist governed countries when controlling
other factors. Fourth, we provided evidence that policy responses and citizen mobility are both
correlated with excess mortality, underscoring our answer as to why excess mortality is higher in
populist governed country. Fifth, we calculated the marginal effects of our regression analyses
and provided evidence that excess mortality is ceteris paribus about 10 percentage points higher
in populist governed countries. In conclusion, the empirical analysis comprehensively supported
the propositions of our theoretical model.
Although our paper followed a rigorous approach and employed several robustness checks,
we want to point out that the empirical paper does not follow a casual identification strategy.
Rather, we provide a comprehensive correlation analysis of the micro foundation of the causal
mechanism proposed in our theoretical model. With additional country and pandemic specific
data, our analysis could be extended with a causal identification strategy via the synthetic control
method (Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2015).
Besides this methodological extension our analysis provides several connection points
for future research. Additional analysis should also include the sub-national level as especially
federal countries can show strong within country variance if the federal government or state
government are populist (Rivera, Rosenbaum, and Quispe, 2020). This sub-national level can
also be analyzed in greater detail using case studies or other qualitative approaches to work out
an in-depth playbook of the populist pandemic response (Smith, 2020).
Further, data is already available on how measures have been taken back over the course of
the pandemic (Hale, Phillips, et al., 2020) and how governments differ in their vaccination efforts
(Hale, Petherick, et al., 2020). Based on our analysis, it is reasonable to assume that systematic
differences between populist and non-populist governed countries will again emerge. Finally,
several governments have used the pandemic to consolidate power and undermine democratic
institutions (Kolvani et al., 2020; Maerz et al., 2020), with early evidence giving reason to
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specifically focus on populist governments, when analyzing the determinants of autocratic
backsliding (Bayerlein and Gyöngyösi, 2020).
Despite the remaining questions and discussed limitations, our paper provided first ev-
idence as to how and why populist governments mishandle the pandemic. We showed that
populist policy responses to the pandemic have been insufficient and that citizen mobility in
populist governed countries is systematically higher. This leads us to the conclusion that populist
governments - on average - have sadly done a poorer job in protecting the population against the
COVID-19 pandemic. As a silver lining, we nonetheless found that citizen mobility is a crucial
component in countering the pandemic successfully. Therefore, the lack of an adequate govern-
ment policy response can be counteracted when citizens overcome the populist polarization and
anti-scientism, and counter the pandemic in a joint effort.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Leaders of the 42 sample countries in 2020
Country Leader Party Date Populist Source
Australia Scott Morrison Liberal Party of Australia From 01/01/2020 No –
Austria Brigitte Bierlein Independent Until 01/07/2020 No –
Austria Sebastian Kurz Austrian People’s Party From 01/07/2020 No –
Belgium Sophie Wilmès Reformist Movement From 01/01/2020 No –
Brazil Jair Bolsonaro Social Liberal Party From 01/01/2020 Yes Hunter and Power 2019
Canada Justin Trudeau Liberal Party of Canada From 01/01/2020 No –
Chile Sebastián Piñera Independent From 01/01/2020 No –
China Xi Jinping Communist Party of China From 01/01/2020 No –
Colombia Iván Duque Márquez Democratic Centre From 01/01/2020 No –
Czech Republic Andrej Babǐs ANO 2011 From 01/01/2020 Yes Rooduijn et al. 2019
Denmark Mette Frederiksen Social Democrats From 01/01/2020 No –
Estonia Jüri Ratas Estonian Centre Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Finland Sanna Marin Social Democratic Party of Finland From 01/01/2020 No –
France Emmanuel Macron The Republic On the Move From 01/01/2020 No –
Germany Angela Merkel Christian Democratic Union From 01/01/2020 No –
Greece Kyriakos Mitsotakis New Democracy From 01/01/2020 No –
Hungary Viktor Orbán Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance From 01/01/2020 Yes Rooduijn et al. 2019
Iceland Katŕın Jakobsdóttir Left Movement – Green Candidature From 01/01/2020 No –
India Narendra Modi Indian People’s Party From 01/01/2020 Yes de la Torre 2019
Ireland Leo Varadkar Family of the Irish Until 06/27/2020 No –
Ireland Micheál Martin Soldiers of Destiny From 06/27/2020 No –
Israel Benjamin Netanyahu Likud – National Liberal Movement From 01/01/2020 Yes de la Torre 2019
Italy Giuseppe Conte Independent From 01/01/2020 No –
Japan Shinzō Abe Liberal Democratic Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Latvia Arturs Kariņš New Unity From 01/01/2020 No –
Lithuania Saulius Skvernelis Independent From 01/01/2020 No –
Luxembourg Xavier Bettel Democratic Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Mexico Andrés López Obrador National Regeneration Movement From 01/01/2020 Yes Urbinati 2019
Netherlands Mark Rutte People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy From 01/01/2020 No –
New Zealand Jacinda Ardern New Zealand Labour Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Norway Erna Solberg Conservative Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Poland Mateusz Morawiecki Law and Justice From 01/01/2020 Yes Rooduijn et al. 2019
Portugal António Costa Socialist Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Russia Vladimir Putin Independent From 01/01/2020 No –
Slovakia Peter Pellegrini Voice – Social Democracy Until 03/20/2020 No –
Slovakia Igor Matovič Ordinary People From 03/20/2020 Yes Rooduijn et al. 2019
Slovenia Marjan Šarec List of Marjan Šarec Until 03/13/2020 No –
Slovenia Janez Janša Slovenian Democratic Party From 03/13/2020 No –
South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa African National Congress From 01/01/2020 No –
South Korea Lee Nak-yon Democratic Party of Korea Until 01/14/2020 No –
South Korea Chung Sye-kyun Democratic Party of Korea From 01/14/2020 No –
Spain Pedro Sánchez Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Sweden Stefan Löfven Swedish Social Democratic Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Switzerland Simonetta Sommaruga Social Democratic Party From 01/01/2020 No –
Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Justice and Development Party From 01/01/2020 Yes Aytac and Önis 2014
United Kingdom Boris Johnson Conservative Party From 01/01/2020 Yes Herzfeld 2019
United States Donald Trump Republican Party From 01/01/2020 Yes Eichengreen 2018
Notes: The table shows our coding of populist and non-populists governments in our sample countries over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our
sample countries are all OECD member states as well as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The coding of populist leaders is based on the
ideational approach to populism and the definition by Cas Mudde (2004) in that populists share anti-establishment orientation (anti-elitism), and claim to
speak for the people against the elites (people centrism).
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Table A2: Excess mortality data coverage and sources
Country Weeks Covered Periodicity Source
Australia 01.2020-43.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Austria 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Belgium 01.2020-04.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Brazil 01.2020-44.2020 Weekly Financial Times
Canada 01.2020-42.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Chile 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
China No data No data No data
Colombia 01.2020-44.2020 Weekly New York Times
Czech Republic 01.2020-01.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Denmark 01.2020-06.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Estonia 01.2020-04.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Finland 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
France 01.2020-04.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Germany 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Greece 01.2020-49.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Hungary 01.2020-02.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Iceland 01.2020-53.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
India No data No data No data
Ireland 01.2020-39.2020 Weekly New York Times
Israel 01.2020-03.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Italy 01.2020-49.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Japan 01.2020-44.2020 Monthly New York Times
Latvia 01.2020-04.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Lithuania 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Luxembourg 01.2020-53.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Mexico 01.2020-41.2020 Weekly Financial Times
Netherlands 01.2020-06.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
New Zealand 01.2020-04.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Norway 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Poland 01.2020-06.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Portugal 01.2020-04.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Russia 01.2020-44.2020 Monthly Financial Times
Slovakia 01.2020-02.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Slovenia 01.2020-52.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
South Africa 01.2020-49.2020 Weekly Financial Times
South Korea 01.2020-53.2020 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Spain 01.2020-04.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Sweden 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Switzerland 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Turkey* 01.2020-52.2020 Weekly New York Times
United Kingdom 01.2020-05.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
United States 01.2020-02.2021 Weekly Human Mortality Database
Notes: The table shows our data sources for the calculation of the excess mortality rate in our sample countries. If
not indicated otherwise. The excess mortality rate is measured weekly and calculated by subtracting the average
weekly mortality rate of the previous five yours from a given week of the year 2020. In Ireland the average
mortality was based on the mortality average of 2012 to 2017. In the Columbia the time between 2015 and 2018
has been used for the calculation of the average. The data from Turkey only refers to excess mortality in Istanbul,
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Table A3: Populist governments and policy response with control variables
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
populist -7.586*** -8.620*** -7.700*** -5.323*** -5.078*** -5.129***

























cardiovasc death rate -0.060*** -0.052***
(0.01) (0.01)
diabetes prevalence -0.189 0.270
(0.17) (0.23)




constant 7.891** 12.087*** -1.572 -47.177*** 10.413*** -78.287***
(3.78) (1.81) (1.97) (5.78) (2.22) (12.13)
Observations 1,743 1,849 1,652 1,796 1,628 1,321
R-squared 0.747 0.747 0.754 0.767 0.635 0.761
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A4: Populist governments and case relative policy response
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
populist -0.400*** -0.400*** -7.702*** -7.621*** -7.621***
(0.15) (0.14) (2.03) (0.51) (1.99)
constant 0.809*** 0.809*** 7.798*** 7.732*** 7.732***
(0.07) (0.07) (2.03) (2.21) (1.97)
Observations 1,560 1,560 1,560 1,560 1,560
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.253 0.306 0.306
Country Fixed Effects No No Yes No Yes
Week Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Robust SE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Robust) standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Populist governments and citizen mobility with control variables
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
populist 9.293*** 8.994*** 6.182*** 7.132*** 5.119*** 19.545***

























cardiovasc death rate 0.003 0.035***
(0.01) (0.01)
diabetes prevalence 1.755*** 1.797***
(0.27) (0.38)






Observations 1,404 1,527 1,400 1,483 1,527 1,233
R-squared 0.202 0.207 0.227 0.235 0.228 0.401
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6: Populist governments and excess mortality with control variables
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
populist 9.214*** 7.193*** 5.096*** 6.606*** 6.576*** 7.354**

























cardiovasc death rate 0.001 -0.046**
(0.01) (0.02)
diabetes prevalence 1.602*** 1.584***
(0.31) (0.44)




constant 11.422* 1.996 2.322 -1.425 -27.022*** -62.772***
(6.07) (2.85) (2.93) (8.16) (3.93) (17.54)
Observations 1,896 2,045 1,804 1,992 1,831 1,437
R-squared 0.296 0.292 0.298 0.309 0.277 0.344
Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 14: Marginal effects for mobility and response
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